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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Eight thousand people die from AIDS in the developing world everyday due to the lack 
of access to essential medicines.1 The main barrier to access is high drug prices.2 Significant 
advances in medicine and technology have improved public health and extended overall life 
expectancy, but not for everyone due to lack of access resulting from exorbitant prices.3 Despite 
government regulatory agencies and pharmaceutical research departments working together to 
develop safe and effective medicines at an increasing rate, access to these medicines has been 
limited.4 Crucial new medicines for infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, Malaria, and 
Tuberculosis are priced out of the reach of the millions of people in the developing world, who 
gravely need them.5 The inflated price of these vital medicines is due in part to global patent 
rules, which restrict the availability and access to affordable generic versions of life-saving 
patented medicines.6 Developing country governments have attempted to improve access to 
essential medicines by taking various measures, which reduce the price of drugs, but they have 
 
1 Ellen ‘t Hoen, European Parliament Committee on International Trade Hearing on TRIPS and Access to 
Medicines, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Jan. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/ETHatEPhearing.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).    
2 Id. at 1. 
3 Jennifer Brant, Robbing the Poor to Pay the Rich?  How the United States Keeps Medicines From the World’s 
Poorest, Oxfam International Briefing Paper, vol. 56, Nov. 2003, available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp031201_robbing_medicines_US.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).    
4 Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and South Africa, 91 KY. L.J. 
911, 913 (2003).   
5 Brant, supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
2faced extreme pressure from developed countries and from the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry based on the current system of global pharmaceutical patent protection.7
[Patents and] medicine are inextricably inter-linked.  Patents are a monopoly.  Drug companies 
possess separate monopolies over many life-saving and other drugs, including those that treat 
HIV-AIDS.  As monopolists, these companies have no compunctions about fixing high prices for 
essential drugs.  High prices create a clear divide between the rich who can afford the medicine 
and the poor who cannot.8
The major complaint concerning current international patent law is the imbalance 
between rights of the pharmaceutical companies and the lack of obligation to provide access to 
essential medicines.9 Despite the assurance from the developed countries that the global patent 
system is a stimulant for pharmaceutical innovation, research, and development; in reality, this 
innovation, research, and development is almost exclusively confined to the private sector and 
areas of profitable return.10 Therefore, in developing countries with relatively small commercial 
markets and low levels of disposable income, there is very little incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to conduct extensive research and development in creating drugs for life-threatening 
diseases limited mostly to the developing world.11 Only 1% of the 1,400 new medicines created 
in the last 25 years were developed for the treatment of tropical diseases (AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis, etc.), despite tropical diseases killing tens of thousands of people each year.12 
Tropical diseases are almost entirely confined to the developing world and again, do not 
represent a profitable market for the pharmaceutical industry.13 The developed country argument 
that patent protection facilitates innovation and thereby improves overall world health is rebutted 
 
7 In 2001, 39 pharmaceutical companies attempted to put pressure on the South African government by suing them 
based on South Africa’s 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, Act. No. 90 of 1997.  Hoen, supra 
note 1 at 1.     
8 Rajeev Dhavan, The Patent Controversy, The Hindu, Dec. 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.hindu.com/2004/12/10/stories/2004121002361000.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
9 Hoen, supra note 1 at 2. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id.at 3. 
3with data showing that although patent protection has increased over the last 20 years, the drug 
innovation rate has fallen and the number of drugs with little or no therapeutic gain has 
increased.14 “Essential medicines are not a luxury whose availability can be left to private 
market forces only, but an essential component of the fulfillment of the right to health.”15 
It is important not to get lost in the legal issues and remember the human side of this 
problem.16 “[E]ffective medicines that dramatically increase the life expectancy of people living 
with AIDS became available in Europe and North America a decade ago.”17 However, despite 
the existence of these drugs, the World Health Organization (WHO) has found that nearly two 
billion people in developing countries still lack regular access to vital medicines.18 Even with 
major progress in disease detection and treatment, eleven million people will die each year, most 
of them in developing countries, as a result of preventable and treatable infectious diseases.19 
Several millions more people in developing countries will suffer with prolonged battles of 
sickness and disability.20 The premature death, sickness, and disability resulting from infectious 
diseases could be avoided if developing countries had better access to affordable medicines.21 
In an increasingly interdependent world, where poverty, disease, violence, crime, war, regional 
conflicts and human rights and environmental [a]buses persist . . . clear international standards 
will help ensure that business will be part of the solution to today’s problems and not – knowingly 
or unknowingly – exacerbate them.22 
14 Id. at 3. 
15 Hoen, supra note 1 at 6. 
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Cut the Cost - Patent Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the Health of Poor People, Oxfam Briefing 
Report, Feb. 2001, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/downloads/patentinjustice.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2005).  
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id.
21 Id.at 3. 
22 Mauro Guarinieri, U.N. Body Favors Scrutiny Of Corporations, European AIDS Treatment Group (EATG), Aug. 
19, 2004, available at http://www.eatg.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=14 (statement 
from the U.N. Wire, Aug. 13, 2004)(last visited Apr. 10, 2005).  
4It is crucial that international and domestic rules affecting research and development 
(R&D) and availability of medicines must be primarily motivated by global public health needs 
rather than simple industrial, economic, or commercial considerations.23 With the dramatic 
increase in infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) and the marginalization by 
pharmaceutical companies and governments of health problems not affecting the developed 
world, strong international support is needed to defend global public health.24 All countries must 
recognize the importance of improving global health by combating neglected diseases.25 
Developed and developing country governments can combat neglected diseases by ensuring 
sufficient, sustainable, and long-term financing to address R&D needs and by working towards 
changing the way health R&D priorities are set and financed.26 Although the global patent 
system has a significant role in stimulating investment and innovation, it also should balance the 
desire to reward inventors with the greater need to allow people to benefit from these inventions 
thereby emphasizing the importance of global public health.27 
[I]n the pharmaceutical sector the winners will be the large northern-based transnational 
companies which, as a result of the lengthened patent protection provided by WTO rules, will be 
able to sell their new medicines at higher prices.  The losers are likely to be the millions of people 
who will be unable to afford vital new medicines, and hard-pressed government health services.  
This situation will undermine efforts to increase productivity and eradicate poverty, and will result 
in a widening of the gap between rich and poor nations.28 
This comment will analyze the need to amend and revise the current global 
pharmaceutical patent system under TRIPS to take into account the needs of developing 
countries and overall public health.  This comment will emphasize that the current international 
trade rules, which although administered by the WTO, are dictated by developed country 
 
23 Hoen, supra note 1 at 6. 
24 Id.
25 Id. at 7. 
26 Id.
27 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 2. 
28 Id.
5governments and powerful pharmaceutical companies, and therefore, without reform will further 
diminish the access of poor people in developing countries to vital medicines.  Part II of this 
comment will provide a general overview of the international trade law governing patents on 
pharmaceuticals focusing specifically on the development of the current global pharmaceutical 
patent system, which was originally created by the WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Law (TRIPS) in 1994, supplemented by the WTO’s Doha Declaration and the WTO’s 
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health.  Further, it will discuss the implicit and explicit exceptions to TRIPS provided within 
TRIPS Articles 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73.  Part III will provide some general arguments used by 
developed countries to justify the imposition of stringent patent laws on developing countries 
and will argue against strong pharmaceutical patent protection in developing countries.  Part IV 
will discuss the implications of TRIPS for developing countries, specifically their access to 
pharmaceuticals in an international trade environment.  Further, it will show how the WTO is 
restricting competition, increasing prices, and limiting access to essential medicines.  Part V will 
discuss the current patent laws of two crucial developing countries, India and South Africa.  Part 
VI will provide possible solutions and considerations for reform of the global patent protection 
system under TRIPS.  Part VII will conclude the comment with a brief summary.       
II.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW GOVERNING PATENTS ON PHARMACEUTICALS 
A. The WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). 
 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), adopted 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, came into 
effect on January 1, 1995 as package deal included in the WTO/General Agreement on Tariffs 
6and Trade (GATT).29 In order to become a member of the WTO, a country must agree to 
become subject to the broad WTO/GATT Agreement, which includes these TRIPS patent 
provisions.30 Developed countries designed TRIPS based on their own intellectual property 
regimes and placed it within the 1995 WTO/GATT Agreement to create binding international 
patent obligations.31 TRIPS created a common set of international intellectual property rules 
establishing minimum levels of patent protection that all countries within the WTO must give to 
other member countries.32 Potential competitors are prohibited from producing and marketing 
cheap generics of these pharmaceutical products for a twenty-year period.33 Thereby giving the 
pharmaceutical patent holder a monopoly based on the exclusive marketing rights on its patented 
product for at least those twenty years.34 
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board enforces TRIPS to ensure member country 
compliance.35 All member country governments must comply with TRIPS by introducing these 
stringent patent laws domestically or face severe penalties from the WTO.36 Although this may 
seem like an easy task, most developing countries do not have strong domestic patent laws, 
therefore TRIPS provides an extremely high standard of patent protection.37 If a member 
country fails to meet its obligations under TRIPS, the burden of proof is on the defending 
 
29 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
30 Barnes, supra note 5 at 917. 
31 Id.
32 Bonita de Boer, TRIPS, AIDS, and Generic Drugs, AVERT.ORG, Jan. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
33 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 11. 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 Id. at 18. 
37 Barnes, supra note 5 at 919-934. 
7country.38 If the defending country fails to meet its burden, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Board most often allows the prosecuting country to impose trade sanctions.39 
By restricting the right of governments to allow the production, marketing, and import of low-cost 
copies of patented medicines (called generic drugs), the WTO’s rules will restrict competition, 
increase prices, and further reduce the already limited access of poor people to vital medicines.40 
TRIPS was theoretically designed as a social policy tool to encourage innovation by 
establishing minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property including patents on 
pharmaceuticals; however, these standards were developed based on Western European and 
North American property law by wealthy countries with little regard for the needs of developing 
countries.41 The major selling point for the issuance of patents is in theory by “providing limited 
exclusivity to the ‘inventors’ of products . . . innovation will be promoted and society as a whole 
will benefit from the availability of new and improved products.”42 In reality, the twenty-year 
global patent protection system has created an extremely profitable and powerful group of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies that by law are allowed to deny access to life-saving 
medicines.43 
1. TRIPS Generally: Preamble &Article 7 (Objectives)  
 
The express intent of TRIPS, declared in the preamble is “to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights [including patents] do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade.”44 TRIPS Article 7 provides that the protection of intellectual 
property rights will promote both technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of 
 
38 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 18. 
39 Id.
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Hoen, supra note 1 at 1-2. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Id.
44 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, preamble. 
8technology “to the mutual advantage of producers and users . . . in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare.”45 
2. TRIPS Limited Implicit and Explicit Exceptions (“Public Health Safeguards”)   
 
Although overall TRIPS grants strong patent protection to member countries, there are 
implicit and explicit exceptions contained in TRIPS Article 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73 that if used 
effectively could provide developing countries with ammunition to combat some of their lack of 
access problems.46 
a. Implicit Exceptions: TRIPS Article 8 (Principles) & TRIPS Article 27 
(Patentable Subject Matter)  
 
TRIPS Article 8 provides a guiding principle upon which all other provisions of TRIPS 
should be read.47 Article 8 mandates that in creating domestic laws, member countries “may, in 
formulating and amending their national laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development.”48 Therefore, Article 8 
provides possible grounds that developing country governments could use to combat tropical 
diseases such as HIV-AIDS.49 
First, it allows governments to adopt measures for the protection of public health.50 
Second, it allows governments to adopt measures for the protection of its own country’s socio-
economic and technological development, which may provide possible grounds for developing 
country governments to combat the effect of the HIV-AIDS crisis on labor, industrial, farming, 
 
45 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 7. 
46 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed 
Countries For Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progressive Global 
Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 755, 808-826 (2004). 
47 Id. at 808. 
48 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 8; Cann, supra note 46 at 808. 
49 Cann, supra note 46 at 808. 
50 Id.
9and food markets.51 Third, the use of the word “necessary” indicates that the government does 
not have complete discretion to use these measures, but that its use is subject to review by the 
WTO.52 Although this seems restrictive, the WTO could use this discretion to instead help 
developing country governments combat life-threatening diseases.53 For example, the WTO 
could grant a developing country government “substantial latitude . . . in the midst of a health 
crisis” pursuant to the clarification of TRIPS through the Doha Declaration and Decision 
discussed below.”54 Fourth, Article 8 is limited to such measures “consistent with the 
provisions” of TRIPS.55 Again, this could be seen a limitation.56 However, since Article 8 was 
intended to be a guiding principle, developing country governments can take public health and 
development measures reflected in the “flexibilities” contained in Articles 27, 30, 31, and 73, 
and still remain consistent with TRIPS pursuant to Article 8.57 Finally, Article 8 allows 
developing country governments “to prevent the ‘abuse’ of intellectual property rights or to 
prevent practices that ‘unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.’”58 These terms “abuse,” “unreasonably restrain trade,” and “adversely affect” are 
subjective and are open to different cultural and economic interpretations, which could provide 
developing country governments will additionally ways to improve access to pharmaceuticals.59 
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
56 Cann, supra note 46 at 809. 
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 “The developing countries, for example, have indicated that an “abuse” of intellectual property rights could 
include the charging of excessively high prices for patented pharmaceuticals, the selling of pharmaceuticals at prices 
beyond “reasonable” profit margins, or the failure to offer products in quantities sufficient to meet market demand.”  
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 8;Cann, supra note 46 at 809.     
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Other possible grounds, which developing country governments might be able to combat 
infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS are found in Articles 27.60 TRIPS Article 27 provides that 
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application.”61 There is considerable room for flexibility and interpretation of TRIPS Article 
27.62 Developing country governments can create domestic patent systems benefiting their own 
countries by developing their own standards and interpretations of the undefined terms in TRIPS 
Article 27 in their own domestic jurisprudence.63 For example, Article 27 (2) allows countries to 
“exclude from patentability inventions . . . necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”64 Developing country governments 
could argue that the HIV-AIDS crisis is a moral or public issue, thereby incorporating social, 
ethical, and moral considerations into the domestic patent regime.65 However, this flexibility 
does not provide developing countries with a clear answer on how to provide better access to 
lifesaving drugs because the denial of patentability of a lifesaving drug would be accompanied 
by denial of any commercial exploitation of the drug within that country including the domestic 
manufacture of generic versions or compulsory licensing of the drug for a profit.66 Arguably, 
developing country governments could, after denying patentability, produce and distribute the 
product non-commercially either through a state-owned enterprise or private non-profit 
manufacturer.67 
60 Cann, supra note 46 at 810. 
61 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 27. 
62 Cann, supra note 46 at 810. 
63 Id.
64 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 27 para. 2. 
65 Cann, supra note 46 at 811. 
66 Id.
67 Id. at 812.   
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[I]f a nation takes the position that the prevention and treatment of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
necessary to protect the ordre public, . . . [TRIPS] . . . would apparently allow that nation to deny 
patent protection to relevant pharmaceuticals and then distribute those products, assuming they are 
attainable, on a non-profit, non-commercial basis.  Since there could be no discrimination between 
the rights of foreign and domestic producers, as neither would be allowed to engage in commercial 
exploitation, such a strategy would appear consistent with the terms of . . . [TRIPS].68 
b. Explicit Exceptions: TRIPS Article 30 (Exceptions to Rights Conferred) & 
TRIPS Article 31 (Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder) & 
Article 73 (Security Exceptions) 
 
In addition to the flexibility inherent in the subjective language of Articles 8 and 27, there are 
explicit exceptions under TRIPS Articles 30, 31, and 73, which developing country governments 
should utilize to improve access to essential pharmaceuticals.69 “Any exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent or other use of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the patent holder must be in accordance with either TRIPS Article 30 or TRIPS 
Article 31.”70 Through these limited exceptions, developing country governments have a few 
significant tools that allow them to balance the public interest of their citizens with the 
proprietary claims of patent holders.71 
First, the developing country government can override a patent by authorizing a compulsory 
license for production of a drug under TRIPS Article 31.72 TRIPS Article 31 allows WTO 
member countries to authorize “other use of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by 
the government.”73 A compulsory patent license is “when a government allows a third party to 
make, use or sell a patented product or a product obtained through a patented process without the 
 
68 Id.
69 Id. at 813. 
70 “TRIPS Article 30 is concerned with limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent other than use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, and therefore, is not affected by or mentioned in either 
the Doha Declaration or the Decision.”  Therefore, no further discussion of Article 30 is needed.  Markus Nolff, 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Decision of the WTO 
Regarding its Implementation:  An “Expeditious Solution”?, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 291 (2004).   
71 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 19. 
72 Id.
73 Nolff, supra note 70 at 296. 
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consent of the patent owner.”74 The “use” referred to in the preamble to TRIPS Article 31 (“use 
by . . . third parties authorized by the government”) includes granting compulsory licenses.75 For 
compulsory licenses, TRIPS Article 31 mandates that: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to 
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and 
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.  This 
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.  In situations of 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, 
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. . . . ; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized 
. . .
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which 
enjoys such use;  
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate 
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which 
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.  The competent authority shall have the 
authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these circumstances; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking 
into account the economic value of the authorization; 
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such shall be subject to 
judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to 
judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;76 
Therefore, Article 31 allows governments to issue compulsory licenses on public health grounds 
to authorize production of patented drugs without the consent of patent holders, subject to 
adequate compensation.77 Governments can also issue compulsory licenses in response to 
national health emergencies.78 “In the case of ‘a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency’ or ‘a public health crisis,’ . . . subparagraph (b) [of TRIPS Article 31] merely 
requires that ‘the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably 
 
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 31 fn.7; Nolff, supra note 70 at 296. 
77 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 5. 
78 Id. at 19. 
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practicable.’”79 Finally, developing country governments can also issue compulsory licenses to 
curtail excessive prices.80 
Governments can grant compulsory licenses for domestic production or importation of 
pharmaceuticals.81 However, there are significant obstacles for developing countries in being 
able to grant compulsory licenses either for domestic production or for parallel importation.82 In 
order for a government to make effective use of a compulsory license for domestic production 
under TRIPS Article 31, it must have a reasonably sophisticated pharmaceutical industry to 
produce medicine and it must have a manufacturer with sufficient manufacturing capacity to 
create economies of scale to keep the costs down and the price of the medicine affordable.83 
Further, to utilize a compulsory license for importation under TRIPS Article 31, the government 
must be able to import the pharmaceuticals at an affordable price in the quantity and quality 
required.84 Many governments cannot utilize the compulsory license for domestic production 
because they do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity.85 
Also many governments cannot utilize the compulsory license for importation because a 
potential importer is prohibited from manufacturing and exporting the drug from a member 
country with sufficient manufacturing capacity.86 Although a compulsory license might be 
granted for the domestic manufacture of a drug in a member country with sufficient 
manufacturing capacity, this potential importing member country is prohibited from exporting a 
large fraction of the drugs made under that compulsory license.87 This is because TRIPS Article 
 
79 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 31 fn. 7 (b); Nolff, supra note 70 at 298.  
80 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 19. 
81 Nolff, supra note 70 at 298. 
82 Id.
83 Nolff, supra note 70 at 298; Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 19. 
84 Nolff, supra note 70 at 298; Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 19. 
85 Nolff, supra note 70 at 298. 
86 Id.
87 Id.
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31(f) permits issuance of compulsory licenses only if it is “predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”88 Therefore, pursuant to these strict 
compulsory license requirements, developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) 
cannot obtain drugs through importation at an affordable price in the quantity and quality 
required.89 As discussed below, this restriction on the use of compulsory licenses for importation 
is even more significant as many developing member countries (like India), who until recently 
have been able to export huge quantities of generic drugs because its domestic patent laws were 
not TRIPS compliant, were required to enact TRIPS compliant domestic laws on January 1, 
2005.90 Therefore, the developing countries with sufficient manufacturing capacity will now be 
more limited in their ability to export medicines to other developing and LDCs, which do not 
have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce life-saving medicines.91 
Second, a government can engage in parallel importing.92 Governments can allow the 
importation of a patented product, which is marketed elsewhere at prices lower than those in its 
domestic market.93 This means importing a patented drug from wherever it is sold the cheapest, 
regardless of the wishes of the patent holder.94 Although parallel importing is not specifically 
mentioned by TRIPS, pharmaceutical companies and developed country government (U.S.) are 
motivated to make sure that it is banned through domestic patent legislation.95 
The last exception is under TRIPS Article 73.96 Article 73 declares that nothing in 
TRIPS shall prohibit a member country from taking any action “which it considers necessary for 
 
88 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 31, fn.7 (f); Nolff, supra note 70 at 298. 
89 Nolff, supra note 70 at 298. 
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Cut the Cost, supra note 18 at 5. 
93 Id.
94 Id. at 19. 
95 Id. at 19. 
96 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 73. 
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the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations.”97 Additionally, TRIPS Article 73 declares that no member country shall 
be prohibited “from taking any action in pursuance of its obligation under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.”98 This security exception, if 
exercised, can relieve a member country from virtually all of its substantive obligations under 
TRIPS.99 
B.  The WTO’s Doha Declaration- Access to Medicine for All 
 
Whether exceptions to patent protection can be made in the case of a public health crisis, 
was one of the critical issues dominating the discussion at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001.100 During this Conference, the WTO released 
its Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration).101 The WTO 
recognized some of the lack of access concerns raised by developing countries when it adopted 
the Doha Declaration.102 In order to attempt to increase access to pharmaceuticals, the Doha 
Declaration granted countries the power to manufacture generic drugs made before the 
introduction of TRIPS and the power to produce newer drugs through compulsory licensing.103 
The 2001 Doha Declaration indicated that the WTO and TRIPS “can and should be interpreted 
 
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Cann, supra note 46 at 822. 
100 Nolff, supra note 70 at 292. 
101 Id. at 292. 
102 Hoen, supra note 1 at 4. 
103 “A compulsory license is a government license that enables people other than the patent holder to copy patented 
or copyrighted products and processes.  Governments can issue them if a patent owner abuses their rights by, for 
example, failing to offer their produce on the market, or offering it at a price that is too high for potential buyers to 
afford.  Competitors can then produce the produce or use the process under government license without fear of 
prosecution.  In the case of generic drugs, compulsory licenses can be issued because of the high (and for developing 
nations, often unaffordable) prices charged by the major pharmaceutical companies for their products.”  Boer, supra 
note 32 at 2. 
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and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicine for all.”104 
Therefore, the Doha Declaration more clearly outlined the flexibilities contained in 
TRIPS that countries could use to overcome the barriers created by patents.105 Further, the Doha 
Declaration extended the transitional period until 2016, during which the LDCs are not obliged 
to enforce or grant patents on pharmaceutical products.106 Unfortunately, the WTO’s Doha 
Declaration failed to resolve whether further exceptions could be made to supply 
pharmaceuticals to countries, which lack sufficient manufacturing capacity to make effective use 
of TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provisions.107 With regard to this unsettled issue, paragraph 6 
of the Doha Declaration simply declared, “We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 
2002.”108 
C.  The WTO’s Decision “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” 
 
Other efforts to solve this lack of access issue were attempted in November 2002 and 
February 2003.109 Finding an acceptable “expeditious solution” became a priority to be solved 
before the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico.110 In August 2003, the 
WTO General Council adopted a Decision entitled “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (Decision).111 In response to 
 
104 World Trade Organization (WTO) – Doha Ministerial Conference 2001:  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] para. 4; Dhavan, supra note 
8. 
105 Hoen, supra note 1 at 4. 
106 Hoen, supra note 1 at 4. 
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Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, immediately before the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the 
WTO General Council approved this Decision, which was designed to make it easier for poor 
developing countries that lack domestic capacity to import cheaper generic drugs produced under 
compulsory licenses.112 Normally, under TRIPS, it would be illegal to copy a brand name drug 
that was still under a patent.113 However, as discussed above, it was agreed in the Doha 
Declaration that TRIPS should not prevent member countries from taking measures to protect the 
public health of its citizens.114 Therefore, this Decision was intended to supplement the Doha 
Declaration by providing clarification of the steps necessary to improve access to essential 
medicines.115 Formally, the Decision is considered an interim good faith waiver of TRIPS 
Article 31(f) to protect public health and is applicable until TRIPS is amended.116 The Decision 
allows any member country that produces generic copies of patented pharmaceuticals under a 
compulsory license to export these products to eligible importing countries (i.e., countries 
without sufficient manufacturing capacity).117 
In order to improve access to essential medicines, a member country lacking sufficient 
manufacturing capacity must follow the general step-by-step process laid out by the WTO in the 
Decision.118 First, an importing member country must notify the TRIPS Council of its request to 
import certain pharmaceuticals indicating the names and expected quantities to be imported.119 
Second, the importing member country must prove it has insufficient pharmaceutical 
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manufacturing capacity for the requested pharmaceuticals.120 Third, the exporting member 
country must issue a compulsory license reflecting that only the quantity necessary to meet the 
specified needs of the importing member country will be manufactured.121 Fourth, the 
compulsory license must indicate that the entire quantity produced for the purpose of this license 
will be exported to the specified importing member country.122 Fifth, “adequate remuneration” 
or compensation should be paid to the patent holder by the exporting member country taking into 
account the “economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been authorized.”123 
Finally, the Decision requires all member countries to take “reasonable measures” to prevent the 
re-exportation of the generic drugs produced under these compulsory licenses and to provide 
“effective legal means for the prevention of diversion.”124 
Although this Decision was intended to provide clarification, instead it created a complex 
mechanism that has not improved drug access in developing countries and has not aided generic 
drug production in countries like India.125 The Decision needlessly complicated the exportation 
process by creating a mechanism that evaluates each situation on a country-by-country and drug-
by-drug basis.126 The WTO’s focus in the Decision on the smaller picture ignores the developing 
country manufacturers’ need to create economies of scale to continue to operate and provide the 
drugs at a reasonable price to developing countries that lack sufficient manufacturing capacity.127 
The WTO appears to be attempting to improve developing countries lack of access 
concerns with the implicit and explicit exceptions contained within TRIPS, the Doha 
Declaration, and the Decision.  All of these attempts to provide clarifications have needlessly 
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added to the complication and confusion revolving around international pharmaceutical patent 
laws.  Although, the WTO is attempting to improve access to pharmaceuticals for certain select 
countries suffering from a national emergency or a public health crisis, developing countries 
should not be held to the same level of stringent patent protection as developed western 
countries.       
III.  PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The protection of pharmaceuticals by patents involve complex issues, therefore there are 
strong arguments in favor and against providing patents in developing countries.  In developed 
countries, intellectual property rights have in some respects evolved into a natural right.128 
Patent rights are now viewed almost as a fundamental entitlement in developed countries and this 
right attaches “to man as a human being much like equal protection, equality, and self-
determination.”129 “[A] fundamental right of man cannot be limited by territorial boundaries, 
and all nations (irrespective of wealth, history, culture, or need) must award universal 
acceptance.”130 The current international patent system is argued to represent a balancing of 
interests designed to maximize global social welfare.131 
A patentee receives exclusive rights over his or her creation for a limited period of time in 
exchange for a complete, public disclosure of the knowledge upon which the invention is based.  
Not only may the public use this knowledge upon the patent’s term expiration, but also the 
knowledge may serve (even during the patent term itself) as the foundation for further 
advancement of science and technology in a variety of fields.  In addition to this general 
dissemination, the monopoly that is granted serves to encourage the patentee to license the 
discovery so that the invention can be commercialized, technology can be transferred, and other 
products can be developed for the benefit of society.  By ensuring protection for creative efforts, 
the patent system also provides the necessary incentive for inventiveness since creators will be 
able to profit from their R&D investments.132 
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A.  Developed Countries’ Arguments for Stringent Patent Protection in Developing Countries 
The first argument used by developed countries to emphasize the importance of the 
international recognition of patents within an international trade environment is that patent 
protection encourages participation in the pharmaceutical industry by providing financial 
incentives.133 “Patents create more certainty of potential profits at the end of the research cycle 
and decrease the risk of investment.”134 Along those same profit-based lines, developed 
countries argue that stringent international patent protection is crucial in allowing pharmaceutical 
companies to recoup their substantial research and development (R&D) costs.135 The 
pharmaceutical industry, unlike other industries, devotes the majority of its resources to R&D.136 
During the last twenty years, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’s percentage of sales allocated to 
R&D increased from 11.9 percent in 1980 to 18.5 percent in 2001.137 Therefore, developed 
countries argue the most effective way to continue to provide financial incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies is to their protect profit margins from being eroded by cheap generic 
drugs through internationally enforceable patent rights.138 
Related to the first argument, the second major argument offered by developed countries 
to justify stringent international patent protection is strong patent protection fuels innovation.139 
Developed countries argue that by providing patents pharmaceutical companies will research and 
develop more drugs that will improve the overall global public health.140 However, most of the 
developed countries’ arguments justifying stringent patent protection do not explicitly revolve 
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around their pharmaceutical companies’ economic interests for obvious political reasons, but 
rather tend to emphasize the global benefits of stringent patent protection in general.141 By 
providing pharmaceutical companies with a monopoly over the sale and distribution of their 
drugs for a fixed time period, developed countries argue that patents are supposed to create 
incentives for R&D activities in every country’s private sectors.142 This basically means that 
developing countries’ ensuing concerns with high pharmaceutical prices and inaccessibility to 
essential medicines are countered with the developed country theory that too much access caused 
by weak patent protection will create more inaccessibility in the long run, resulting in the 
stagnancy of new drug discoveries.143 
Third, developed countries argue that stringent patent protection is necessary to create an 
international trade environment.144 Supporters of TRIPS argue that international law creating 
enforceable intellectual property rights are necessary to create an international economy and are 
a natural progression from the post-World War II economy.145 Therefore, the inclusion of 
TRIPS as a WTO agreement is a requisite gradual move towards economic globalization.146 
“[T]he push for more secure and stable international trading systems, and the emergence of the 
hyper-connected international economy, have necessitated strict intellectual property 
protections.”147 
The fourth argument offered by developed countries for the importance of international 
patent law emphasizes the benefits available to developing countries through technology transfer 
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and foreign direct investment.148 “TRIPS . . . encourages technology sharing, which could lead 
to pharmaceutical companies (both generic and multi-national) sharing expertise, giving more 
developing countries the capability to produce drugs for their own people.”149 Developed 
countries argue that the benefits from strong patent protection will not be limited to their own 
rich and powerful pharmaceutical companies, but will assist local manufacturers in developing 
countries to establish their own R&D activities, which will be better suited to local needs.150 In 
the international patent process, developing countries are supposed to benefit from the 
dissemination of knowledge required through patent disclosures, which can be used as inputs for 
more innovation.151 
Therefore, IPRs [including patents] will support innovative behavior that adapts existing 
technologies to local needs of which the cumulative effect can ignite growth in knowledge and 
economic activity.  The local firms will also have an equal opportunity to sell their products 
abroad in order to reap the higher profits currently enjoyed by western [multinational 
pharmaceutical enterprises] that own the majority of existing pharmaceutical patents.152 
Developed countries argue stringent patent protection facilitates contracting 
between firms and increases technology transfer, thereby increasing the production of 
drugs and the efficiency of the R&D process for new drugs.153 For example, technology 
transfer can occur through the shipment of advanced inputs to subsidiaries in local 
markets in developing countries.154 In this way, pharmaceutical companies can 
theoretically indirectly share blueprints, product designs, and skilled producer services.155 
Along these lines, developed countries argue that developing countries will 
benefit from international pharmaceutical patent law through foreign direct investment 
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from wealthy member countries to poor member countries with stable patent protection 
systems.156 With strong international patent protection, pharmaceutical companies 
should be more willing to commit to “foreign direct investment, joint ventures, and 
licensing agreements in developing countries.”157 Developed countries argue that as 
patent laws are strengthened in developing countries, foreign direct investment is likely 
to increase “in complex, but easily copied technologies” including pharmaceuticals.158 
Without stringent patent protection not only will the providers of foreign direct 
investment hesitate to invest in these developing countries, but many pharmaceutical 
companies may refuse to export their drugs in order to protect their global profit 
margins.159 Therefore, the thrust of the developed countries’ argument is it is the 
developing world’s responsibility to provide a business environment friendly to the needs 
of wealthy, multinational pharmaceutical companies in order to have access to essential 
medicines.160 
B.  Developing Countries’ Arguments Against Stringent Patent Protection in Developing 
Countries 
 
Developing countries argue that instead of patents being viewed as a fundamental or 
natural right, patent protection should instead merely represent a conscious governmental 
decision to maximize social welfare and patents should instead be viewed as governmental 
“grants,” “licenses,” or “privileges,” which could then be conditioned or even refused rather than 
universally accepted.161 Unfortunately for developing countries whether rightfully or 
wrongfully, these intellectual “property” rights have been placed on a “moral plane” by powerful 
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developed countries and have been removed from political and ideological challenge.162 
Although, developed countries have strong arguments in favor of stringent patent protection, 
developing countries have even strong counter-arguments that patent protection should be more 
flexible in developing countries.    
First, in response to developed countries’ arguments that stringent international patent 
protection is needed to allow pharmaceutical companies to continue to operate, to create 
financial incentive for innovation, and to allow them to recoup their R&D costs, developing 
countries argue that it is unfair to deny access to essential medicines simply because poor 
developing countries do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce or develop these 
essential medicines.  In fact, “[o]nly a few developed countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and United States) in the world have the 
sufficiently sophisticated pharmaceutical industry and significant research base necessary to 
conduct complex research and development activities.”163 Further, many monopolist drug 
companies receive tax benefits and foundation funds that help them finance their R&D costs.164 
However, developed countries have used this power to restrict access to developing countries 
and to place significant pressure on developing countries to strictly conform their domestic 
patent laws to TRIPS.165 
Second, although developed countries argue that “[u]ltimately, the economic incentives 
derived from monopoly power of individual pharmaceuticals will benefit overall global welfare 
through the discovery of new drugs and therapies that cure debilitating, if not fatal, diseases.”166 
In reality, only a few pharmaceutical companies (including GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis) have 
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increased their investment in infectious-disease research and even fewer (only GlaxoSmithKline) 
have increased their investment in vaccine development, but only on a small scale.167 Developed 
countries argue that one of the disadvantages arising out of weak patent protection in developing 
countries is corresponding a lack of focus by pharmaceutical companies on diseases and illnesses 
prevalent in developing countries.168 However, it is clear that without great financial incentives 
pharmaceutical companies will not focus on diseases and illnesses prevalent in developing 
countries.     
Third, the developed country theory that stronger patent protection is essential to promote 
a stable international economy169 has created a small group of powerful pharmaceutical 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) worldwide with significant influence in shaping domestic and 
international patent policies.170 Unfortunately, it is primarily these pharmaceutical companies’ 
business concerns that dictate developed countries’ approaches to implementing patent rights on 
an international scale.171 In reality, these patent rights give pharmaceutical companies 
monopolies over lifesaving medicines and allow the pharmaceutical company to restrict 
competition, limit access, and increase prices.      
Finally, contrary to the developed country argument that patent protection facilitates 
technology transfer and foreign direct investment, developing countries argue that the current 
system does not transfer technology or increase foreign direct investment.  Developing countries 
argue contrary to the argument that the creation of stringent international patent protection will 
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provide developing countries with more access to up-to-date technologies through technology 
transfer, instead developing countries become isolated from new technologies and the only 
solution is for them to begin building their own technological knowledge from scratch.172 This is 
a nearly impossible mission given their economic constraints.173 
TRIPS should not have been included within the WTO/GATT Agreement.174 
Monopolies should have no place in an international free trade agreement.175 Unfortunately, so 
far developed country governments have been more spirited in defending its pharmaceutical 
companies than developing countries (like India and South Africa) have been able to defend its 
poor who desperately need access to life sustaining drugs.176 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ENVIRONMENT- HOW THE WTO IS RESTRICTING COMPETITION,
INCREASING PRICES, AND LIMITING ACCESS 
A.  Creating Corporate Pharmaceutical Monopolies Through the Auspices of Free Trade  
 
1.  Big Money Means Big Political Power for the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Although created under the auspices of free trade, TRIPS, was the product of intense 
lobbying by the world’s largest and most powerful pharmaceutical companies (Merck, Pfizer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, and Eli Lilly) and of intense political pressure by the world’s largest and most 
powerful countries (U.S., Europe, and Japan).177 To put it in perspective, the financial power of 
these pharmaceutical companies relative to developing countries is reflected by their market 
capitalization, which is collectively greater than the economies of Mexico and India and twice 
the gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa.178 This financial power has been converted 
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into tremendous political influence both nationally and internationally.179 The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the most powerful pharmaceutical industry 
lobby in the U.S., was a driving force in getting TRIPS adopted and now plays a leading role in 
encouraging the Bush Administration to use bilateral negotiations and unilateral economic 
sanctions180 against countries that PhRMA believes offer inadequate patent protection.181 
Granting patent protection to pharmaceutical companies creates pharmaceutical monopolies, 
which in turn translates into higher drug prices based on the companies’ ability to limit access to 
these drugs.182 To reduce drug prices, the WTO should consider a major reformation of TRIPS, 
in order to create a competitive market for generic drugs in developing countries.183 
2.  With Big Power Comes Big Responsibility:  Pharmaceutical Companies’ Duty to 
Supply- Patents and Prices 
 
Pharmaceutical companies should accept that their long-term economic interest is better 
served by accepting corporate social responsibility including adopting a more flexible approach 
to drug prices and patents in developing countries.184 “Patents are not a gift for drug companies 
to exercise power without responsibility.”185 These pharmaceutical companies, by showing a 
greater sensitivity to the urgent health needs of developing countries, can restore the legitimacy 
of the pharmaceutical industry, as its power ultimately depends on the trust of the public and 
governments.186 
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In January 2004, after the Brazillian government threatened to override patents and 
license generic manufacture, five international pharmaceutical companies cut the price of their 
drugs allowing the Brazilian government to save approximately 80 million dollars187 in its annual 
drug bill for anti-retrovirals (ARVs).188 This tremendous savings will help to ensure the 
sustainability of Brazil’s world-renowned treatment program.189 In addition, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb surrendered its exclusive right to Thailand to produce its ARV (didanosine or ddI) after a 
three-year legal battle initiated by local activists, who claimed that the high price of the ARV 
was an infringement of the human rights of sufferers.190 This enabled the Thai government’s 
pharmaceutical labs to manufacture a generic equivalent of the ARV at a fraction of the annual 
1,800 dollars191 per patient originally charged by the pharmaceutical company.192 Unfortunately, 
Pfizer, the largest pharmaceutical company in the world, still rejects the idea of offering lower 
prices in developing countries and instead prefers to respond to public pressure by donating 
several drugs to treatment programs in select countries.193 Although, these donations are helpful, 
they are unsustainable and do not provide a viable solution to the lack of access concerns.194 
Pharmaceutical companies should attempt to improve developing country access to essential 
pharmaceuticals without such government or activist threats.  One example, in December 2003, 
pharmaceutical companies GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim allowed generic 
manufacturing firms to provide generic versions of their ARVS to South African patients.195 As 
discussed above, many of these changes only came about after these companies were facing legal 
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action and widespread social disapproval, but anytime drug prices are reduced or drug access is 
increased, it is an improvement.196 
Pharmaceutical companies should improve developing country access to essential 
medicines by issuing voluntary licenses.197 This would provide a way around TRIPS as major 
pharmaceutical companies, as patent holders can bypass the TRIPS patent system by issuing 
voluntary licenses to allow other people to copy their drugs under certain conditions.198 This 
would make it easier for these pharmaceutical companies’ drugs to be produced generically with 
the permission of the company and would greatly improve access.199 Pharmaceutical companies 
can work with developing countries rather than compounding the problem by imposing trade 
sanctions against developing countries.  For example, in 2001, thirty-nine major pharmaceutical 
companies attempted to sue the South African government for passing a law not TRIPS 
compliant that allowed easy production and importation of generics.200 
Following immense pressure from the South African government, the European Parliament and 
300,000 people from over 130 countries that signed a petition against the action however, they 
were forced to back down.  In an effort to put an end to the continuing row, one of the companies, 
GlaxoSmithKline, even granted a voluntary license to a major South African generics producer 
(Aspen), allowing them to share the rights to their drugs AZT, 3TC and the combination Combivir 
without charge.  In return, Aspen had to promise to give 30 percent of their net sales to one or 
more non-governmental organi[z]ations fighting HIV and AIDS in South Africa, which they 
continue to do to this day.201 
In addition to the pharmaceutical companies’ duty to supply, there is also hope that 
generic drug manufacturing companies in developing countries will assume some of this 
responsibility to supply essential medicines and will invest more in R&D instead of simple 
reverse engineering.202 This will allow developing country drug manufacturers to develop 
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original low cost medicines on their own.203 Some of Indian companies (Cipla and Ranbaxy) 
have already begun assuming some of this responsibility by taking advantage of the fact that they 
are able to make a variety of different drugs from many competing pharmaceutical companies.204 
These companies have combined various ARVs into a one-a-day, easy-to-take fixed dose 
combinations that would be very difficult to manufacture in developed countries due to patent 
protection, but that are essential to HIV-AIDS treatment in developing countries due to their 
simplicity.205 Since different drug companies hold the patents on each individual component of a 
drug, pharmaceutical patents hinder the development and availability of recommended fixed 
dosed combinations, which are extremely important in effective HIV-AIDS treatment.206 
Therefore, if drug manufacturing companies assume some of this duty to supply by creating low 
cost medicines on their own, the access to essential medicines in developing countries to 
individuals suffering from HIV-AIDS in developing countries would greatly improve.207 
The importance of developing country access to second-line drugs is another reason why 
generic drug manufacturing companies should accept a duty to supply essential medicine to 
developing countries.  Unfortunately, first-line drugs, whether brand name or generic, fail in 
approximately twenty percent of patients who take them.208 Therefore, some patients need 
access to second-line drugs due to side effects or resistance.209 As discussed above, while the 
Doha Declaration offers measures to protect the access of existing generics, much more needs to 
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be done to ensure the production and access to generic second-line drugs.210 This is an enormous 
problem in developing countries because as the number of patients on first-line drugs grows and 
treatment failures occur, significant numbers of patients will require second-line brand name 
drugs that can cost over $3,500 each year, which is approximately twenty times the cost of 
generic drugs.211 Doctors Without Borders is hopeful that within the next few years, new 
formulations of cheap generic first-line drugs might have fewer side effects and have fewer 
instances of failure.212 Further, they are hopeful that generic drug manufacturers will continue 
working on cheap versions of second-line drugs.213 For example, “[o]ne promising prospect is to 
incorporate [the drug] Viread . . . made by Gilead Sciences Inc. . . . into lower-cost, second-line 
treatments for poor [developing] countries.”214 Gilead has been selling Viread to developing 
countries for only its cost of production ($1.30 per day), but Gilead has now offered to sell 
Viread at 80 cents per day.215 Despite the fact that the cost of Viread is higher than the price of 
some three-drug combinations, it demonstrates that cost of second-line drugs might not have to 
be as devastating to budgets as some fear.216 However, if the Bush Administration succeeds in 
combating the production of these second-line generics through the use of trade agreements with 
individual countries, these countries will be precluded from using any low cost, second-line 
generic drug.217 Although the responsibility does not fall solely on pharmaceutical and generic 
manufacturing companies, it is crucial to global health that these companies take additional steps 
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to improve access to essential medicines whether by cutting prices, issuing voluntary licenses, 
developing fixed-dose combination drugs, or developing generic versions of second-line drugs. 
B.  Governmental Duty to Supply 
 
It is both pharmaceutical companies’ and governments’ duty to supply medicine for 
AIDS.218 It has been suggested that a constitutional approach to international law should be 
considered.219 The international community should recognize “the interlocking relationships of 
enforceable contractual and normative duties that have developed between states and their 
citizens and between sovereigns and other sovereigns.”220 This argument goes beyond the scope 
of this comment, but provides an interesting focus on global welfare and of a government’s duty 
to provide access to essential medicines rather than focusing merely on the provisions of 
TRIPS.221 AIDS is a global health concern as it has spread to 40 million victims throughout the 
world.222 Although Africa has been hit the hardest, AIDS has infected India and all 31 provinces 
of China.223 “Medicine without social justice is unacceptable.”224 Therefore, two developing 
countries, Costa Rica and Venezuela have required their governments to supply AIDS drugs.225 
Although, it is not easy for governments to supply drugs, there are several alternatives 
that could be employed to improve access to essential medicines.  As discussed above, one 
method of improving access to essential medicines is through compulsory licenses.  To reiterate, 
the WTO Decision allows member countries to import generics from other countries under 
compulsory licenses if the member country was unable to manufacture drugs within their home 
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country and was suffering from a serious health crisis.226 For LDCs and developing countries 
with insufficient or no capacity to manufacture drugs, it is a necessity for their governments to 
import drugs.227 Third world countries have only two ways to obtain medicine: to access cheap 
medicine from countries with sufficient manufacturing capabilities (like India) or to pay 
exorbitant monopoly prices.228 For example, the Indian government could grant compulsory 
licenses to domestic manufacturers who could export medicines to LDCs to get around this 
problem, but that process can be extremely difficult, time-consuming, and complicated for 
governments to implement.229 Despite the public health need, there are many political and 
practical reasons (including drug regulation, fear of trade sanctions, jeopardizing supply of aid 
and investment from wealthy countries, etc.) why many governments do not grant compulsory 
licenses.230 Accordingly, one example of the reluctance of developing countries to issue 
compulsory license is that the Zambian government, which declared a state of national 
emergency in September 2004, has been the only government willing to grant a compulsory 
license for AIDS drugs still under patent based on the scale of its HIV-AIDS crisis.231 
Additionally, wealthy developed country governments have a responsibility to 
help improve global health to essential medicines to developing countries by contributing 
to prevention, treatment, and support programs that improve access to essential 
medicines, whether they are generic or brand name.  Wealthy developed country 
governments (including the U.S. and Western European countries) need to boost their 
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support of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.232 A UNAIDS 
report released as the 15th International AIDS Conference estimated the cost of HIV 
prevention, drug treatment, and support of AIDS orphans in the developing world in 2005 
at $12 billion and this jumps to $20 billion in 2007.233 
Although, the U.S. initially led the world in contributions to the Global Fund, the 
Bush Administration seems to favor its own program, President’s Emergency Program 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), that assist only the 15 hardest-hit countries rather than the 
128 countries that the Global Fund assists.234 The French medical organization Doctors 
Without Borders235 contends that the Bush Administration’s policies are designed to 
squash generic AIDS drugs because these drugs are made by overseas companies that 
ignore Western patents and have lower labor expenses.236 The Global Fund accepts and 
uses these generic medicines, but the U.S. refuses to do so whereas the majority of the 
drugs prescribed by Doctors Without Borders are generic copies costing $140 to $300 a 
year, compared with $12,000 for brand-name equivalents.237 For example, skeptics assert 
the Bush Administration’s program that approves generic drugs only if the companies can 
prove the generics work the same as their patented counterparts, is just another barrier to 
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keep generics out of their program.238 No generic drug to date has been cleared by this 
“fast track” process.239 
Further, developed country governments’ have a duty to provide support for the TRIPS 
flexibilities affirmed in the Doha Declaration.  Unfortunately, in recent years, there has been a 
“systematic dismantling” of the Doha Declaration due to corporate and governmental undue 
influence.240 This “systematic dismantling” has been caused by the lack of political support for 
the use of TRIPS flexibilities.241 One example of this is reflected in the “TRIPS plus” provisions 
in bilateral trade agreements with the U.S., which effectively destroy the Doha Declaration’s 
intent to utilize these flexibilities.242 Even the European Parliament is concerned with the 
dismantling of the Doha Declaration advanced “insidiously through US-initiated Free Trade 
Agreements.”243 For example, the proposed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
between the U.S., five Central American nations, and the Dominican Republic “essentially grants 
pharmaceutical companies a monopoly on new drugs registered in member countries.”244 
CAFTA even goes further than TRIPS “by requiring member countries to compensate patent 
owners for ‘unreasonable delays’ in obtaining a patent or market approval of a patented product 
by extending the patent life.”245 Developed countries play a big role in giving political support 
for these flexibilities.246 For example, it has been recommended to the European Parliament that 
it ensure that the European Commission  “provides strong political support to countries that use 
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the TRIPS flexibilities and offers technical assistance.”247 Further, the European Commission 
must ensure that the Indian government, with its new Indian patent policies, will be able to 
continue its production and exportation of generic versions of newer medicines.248 
Another instance of misinterpretation and misapplication of the Doha Declaration leading 
to the “systematic dismantling” of the Doha Declaration was by Canada, which contrary to the 
purpose of the WTO’s Decision, Canada created a list of approved medicines that could be 
exported in generic form to developing countries.249 This list of approved medicines allowed 
drug industry lobbyists to keep new medicines off the list of approved medicines.250 This 
included Bayer’s pneumonia therapy drug (moxifloxacin) and certain fixed dose AIDS drug 
combinations which are recommended by the WHO and which are vital for treating AIDS in 
developing countries.251 
Regretfully, these hollow measures are often hailed as great progress, and the public and 
parliamentarians are led to believe that access problems have been resolved and that affordable 
medicines will now become available and no further action is needed.  Such an approach would be 
disastrous.252 
As of January 1, 2005, the access to new drugs is expected to become even more 
difficult.253 This is because starting in 2005 all new drugs may be subject to at least 20 years of 
patent protection in all countries excluding the LDCs and the non-WTO countries.254 However, 
a major concern is India because it supplies the majority of the affordable ARVs essential for 
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AIDS treatment.255 According to the WHO, a number of developing countries implementing 
HIV-AIDS treatment programs are concerned with the catastrophic effects to their own countries 
based solely on India’s implementation of TRIPS.256 Brazil and Thailand provide examples of 
other developing countries that had successfully implemented HIV-AIDS programs before 
January 1, 2005 because key drugs had not yet been patent protected and therefore, these 
countries were producing HIV-AIDS drugs locally at much lower costs.257 However, based on 
these new restrictions and challenges imposed after January 1, 2005, it is crucial that developed 
and developing countries adhere to the flexibilities discussed in the TRIPS Agreement and 
affirmed in the Doha Declaration to provide access to developing countries.258 
The implications for developing countries as a result of TRIPS restricting competition, 
increasing prices, and limiting access to essential medicines are critical.  TRIPS should be 
amended to take into consideration developing country interests by eliminating pharmaceutical 
monopolies and promoting global health through the imposition of governmental and corporate 
duties to provide access to essential medicines.  However, until TRIPS is amended to promote 
access for all, all member countries should keep the following suggestions in mind as developing 
countries attempt to comply with the January 1, 2005 WTO deadline for domestic adoption of 
TRIPS compliant patent laws in developing countries.   
First, it is imperative that generic drug producing countries (like Brazil, Thailand, and 
India) realize the importance of the public health safeguards affirmed in the Doha Declaration 
and routinely make use of these compulsory licenses and government use provisions in order to 
allow the export of these medicines and to enable the generic competition to drive down the 
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prices of these medicines.259 Second, it is important for developing country manufacturers to set 
a policy that if a patent holder does not respond to production on reasonable commercial terms 
within a stipulated period, a compulsory license will be granted in that country.260 Third, the 
developing country manufacturer should limit the patent holder’s royalty because setting high 
royalties allows the patent holder to take money from the manufacturer without any real 
contribution to the manufacturing process.261 Fourth, although the compulsory license will be 
predominately for the manufacturing countries’ domestic market, it is crucial to allow export to 
developing countries and LDCs with insufficient or no capacity to manufacture drugs without the 
government being required to get the patent holder’s permission to export.262 Finally, 
developing countries should emphasize the importance of the basic initial requirements of 
granting patents including novelty, inventive step, and industrial application.263 If these 
requirements are not met, too many patented drug monopolies will be created.264 For example, 
combination drugs and compounds do not meet the requirement of inventive step; therefore they 
should not be worthy of patent protection.265 
V.  CURRENT DOMESTIC PHARMACEUTICAL PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. Indian Pharmaceutical Patent Law and Recent Developments 
 
A number of countries produce generic drugs including Canada, Brazil, South Africa, 
China, and Singapore, but the biggest producer is India.266 Indian companies not only produce 
the finished tablet form of generic drugs, but they also produce cheaper versions of the raw 
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ingredients and chemicals to export to major pharmaceutical companies to use in their brand 
name drugs.267 A number of developing countries also produce generic AIDS drugs including 
Brazil, which has a very large generic pharmaceutical industry that enables its government to 
provide free ARVs to everyone that needs them.268 India also produces large volumes of ARVs 
for its own people and for export.269 These thriving generic pharmaceutical industries in 
developing countries, especially India, have shown that the price fixed by pharmaceutical 
companies have nothing to do with the cost of production, but more to do with the power of 
these companies as monopolies.270 
“On May 6, 1981, Indira Gandhi declared India’s policy when she said her ‘idea of a 
better world is one in which medical discoveries would be free from patent and there will be no 
profiteering from life and death.’”271 India’s policy quickly changed between 1987 and 1994 
when the WTO treaty was negotiated.272 The Indian Parliamentary records reflected great 
concern with the “‘grave impact of the proposed patent . . . on the drug prices in the country’ and 
warned that the ‘primacy of public interests for the right of patent holders should be ensured.’”273 
India passed the First Patents Amendment Act in 1999, the Second Amendment Act in 2002, and 
the Third Amendment Bill of 2003, which did not contain any ameliorative amendments and 
which was passed without change or discussion due to the implicit threat of WTO retaliation for 
non-compliance.274 From 1995 to 2004, many foreign pharmaceutical companies filed 
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anticipatory claims against generic manufacturers under the WTO’s “mail box” procedure,275 
which would become full-fledged patents on January 1, 2005.276 
Until the end of 2004, India had no regulations on patenting, which is one of the reasons 
generic drug manufacturing became such a large-scale industry.277 However, as India was 
mandated to meet the January 1, 2005 deadline to comply with the TRIPS regime, some of the 
cheap, generic anti-AIDS drugs India is famed for could be a thing of the past due to the new 
Indian patent laws that will come into force.278 By rushing to comply with the TRIPS deadline, 
some argue that India has turned its own domestic law upside down and has given greater 
credence to WTO deadlines than to democracy.279 
The WTO treaty is not the only treaty that India has to comply with.  It is also a signatory to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Civil and Political and Economic and Social 
Rights Covenants (1996) and a host of others.  The Supreme Court decisions culminating in and 
following Vishaka’s case (1997) have directly imported many human rights into the life and 
liberty provisions of Article 21, including the right to health.  The WTO cannot over-rise these 
obligations. 280 
Fortunately, although most of the ARVs listed as essential treatments by the WHO did 
not become physically available until 1996 or later, they had been patented well before TRIPS 
was introduced in 1995, therefore they can continue to be produced by India legally.281 For 
drugs patented after 1995, if the original drug producer had also filed for and had been granted a 
patent in India, as of January 1, 2005282 all current production of that drug must stop and all 
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future production would be illegal for 20 years.283 Developing countries, like India, are not 
influenced by the same sources or factors as developed countries (powerful pharmaceutical 
lobbyists and international trade) when creating national patent laws.284 Instead, India’s patent 
laws have been influenced by protectionism.285 
India adopted weak patent laws especially with respect to pharmaceuticals due to 
concerns about the future of India’s pharmaceutical industry and domestic health concerns.286 
In response to TRIPS, as well as to disputes with the U.S. and the WTO, the Indian government 
adopted the 1999 Patents Amendment Act to comply with WTO recommendations.287 This Act 
sought to provide stronger patent protection for foreign pharmaceuticals and to create stronger 
domestic research capabilities.288 For example, an Indian company (Ranbaxy Lab, Inc.) signed a 
$90 million dollar joint venture with Eli Lilly & Co. to collaborate for pharmaceutical research 
and development.289 These Indian patent laws could allow the Indian pharmaceutical industry to 
modernize its pharmaceutical industry and compete with the developed world.290 
Although India has historically been against international patent regimes, in March 2005, 
the Indian government seriously considered whether it should strengthen its domestic patent 
protection based on the current strength of its pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.291 In 
2004, the Indian Parliament originally attempted to adopt domestic legislation to comply with 
TRIPS, but when parliamentary approval for a modified patent law system became impossible in 
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December 2004, the Indian government introduced an ordinance to ensure TRIPS compliance in 
time for the deadline.292 This patent ordinance was heavily criticized and opposed by civil 
society groups and the Indian parliament for going beyond the demands of TRIPS.293 Further, it 
was argued that the patent ordinance failed to fully incorporate the public health flexibilities 
provided in TRIPS and the Decision, outlining the circumstances under which countries can 
export and import generic versions of drugs still under patent.294 
Accordingly, on March 23, 2005, the Indian government passed a controversial patent 
law designed to replace the patent ordinance following heated debate between the global drug 
industry and Indian firms versus Indian generic manufacturers (Cipla) over the last few 
months.295 NGOs argue that effective compulsory licensing procedures play an important role in 
reducing the price of drugs and in ensuring access to affordable medicines, however the new 
Indian patent law is not adequate.296 The Indian Union Minister of Commerce and Industry 
argues that the Indian government included enough safeguards in the 2005 Patents Amendment 
Act to prevent drug price increases.297 The Indian Union Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
Shri Kamal Nath in support of the new Indian patent law said:        
The price of medicines will not shoot up due to patents, because of these strong safeguards, checks 
and balances.  There are comprehensive provisions in the amended Act to deal with issues 
concerning the price and availability of medicines.  These include provisions for compulsory 
licensing to ensure availability of products at reasonable price; parallel import of products; 
acquisition of patent rights by the government; revocation of patents in the public interest; and 
provisions to deal with emergency situations.298 
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B. South African Pharmaceutical Patent Law and Recent Developments  
 
Unlike India’s patent laws, which have been influenced by protectionism, South Africa’s 
controversial patent laws have been influenced by the serious public health crisis in South Africa 
due to HIV-AIDS.299 Therefore, in 1997, the South African Parliament passed the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act based on its public health crisis.300 The Minister of Health 
was allowed to use the tools within this Act to override patent protections including parallel 
importing and compulsory licensing to provide access to pharmaceuticals.301 The Act allowed 
the South African government to use compulsory licensing provided the drug was initially 
marketed by the patentee or with the patentee’s consent and the drug does not have other 
restrictions.302 In fact, the patent holder rights would be overruled if those patent rights 
prevented South African companies from domestically developing effective versions of the 
medicines.303 
The [M]inister [of Health] may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines . 
. . so as to protect the health of the public, and . . . may [allow the importation of medicine] which 
is imported by a person other than the person who is the holder of the [patent].  [T]he council may 
. . . issue . . . a license to manufacture or act as a wholesaler of or distribute . . . such medicine or 
medicinal device.304 
However, in April 2001, the South African Parliament passed the South African 
Medicines and Medical Devices Regulated Authority Act (SAMMDRA).305 Since SAMMDRA 
was passed, the South African government has not attempted to grant any compulsory licenses 
and therefore, the international community has lifted its intense pressure to strictly comply with 
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TRIPS.306 Recently, some progress in solving the lack of access concerns of South Africa have 
been made due to reductions in drug prices and withdrawal of litigation.307 For example, the 
pharmaceutical industry dropped its court case against South Africa and the U.S. government 
dropped its WTO dispute settlement proceeding against Brazil.308 
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION SYSTEM UNDER TRIPS  
 
The current system of global pharmaceutical patent protection under TRIPS needs to be 
amended or revised to consider more specifically the needs of developing countries.  Some 
examples of possible solutions and considerations to improve access include: 
• Reducing the Prices and Increasing the Access to Pharmaceuticals in Developing 
Countries309 
• Recognizing the Importance and Value of Generic Competition in International Trade310 
• Creating a Systematic Tiered Pricing Mechanism for Pharmaceuticals311 
• In Granting Patent Protection, Emphasize Inventive Step and Novelty and Limit the 
Duration and Scope of Patent Protection in Developing Countries312 
• Creating or Amending Domestic Patent Laws to Make Full Use of the Flexibilities 
(Public Health Safeguards) in TRIPS by Emphasizing Public Health Over Patent Rights 
(Preventing the Systematic Dismantling of the Doha Declaration)313 
• Allowing Developing Countries Without the Ability to Manufacture Pharmaceuticals To 
More Easily Be Able to Import Them314 
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• Eliminating Developed Country Strategies for Bullying of Developing Countries (i.e., 
elimination of trade sanctions, TRIPS plus provisions in bilateral or regional trade 
agreements, contingent technical assistance, etc.)315 
• Creating an International Fund for Research, Subsidizing Pharmaceutical Costs, 
Improving Health Services, and Improving Delivery Systems316 
Recently, developing countries have gained considerable power in the world of 
international trade.  “The World Trade Organization’s ministerial conferences have demonstrated 
a considerable willingness on the part of developing countries to build alliances among 
themselves as a way of countering the [influence] of the rich [developed] countries during trade 
negotiations.”317 The inequalities created within the WTO agreements gave an overwhelming 
amount of power to rich developed countries.318 Developing countries must remedy the 
unfairness found in these WTO trade agreements by adopting stronger negotiating postures 
within the WTO trade talks.319 Developed countries like the U.S. and the E.U. have to be 
prevented from imposing their individually created “agreements” on other less powerful 
members.320 Therefore, developing countries have to build solid alliances among themselves 
focused on specific negotiating proposals in order to be effective in trade talks.321 Although, it 
seems impossible for developing countries to counter the intense political and financial power of 
big developed countries, developing countries are gaining some power within the WTO.  This 
new, strong posture of developing countries has gradually emerged from the WTO Seattle 
Ministerial Conference demonstrations and from the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference 
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proposals offered by developing countries on access to medications, which led to the Doha 
Declaration.322 
While considerable progress has been made in including developing countries like Brazil 
and India in the decision-making nucleus of the WTO, a series of new challenges have emerged 
from this new developing country power dynamic.323 Although the involvement of developing 
countries in the decision-making process is a clear improvement, the exclusion of other 
developing countries is unacceptable.324 It is crucial not to create a WTO decision-making 
process, where the decisions are primarily made in small group alliances, whether developed or 
developing countries.325 Encouraging these small alliances between member countries ultimately 
encourages the exclusion of certain other member countries.326 Therefore, it is important to 
keep the decision-making process open to all member countries to create an international trade 
system based on democratic form and transparency.327 In order for the developing country 
power dynamics emerging from the WTO Cancun Ministerial Conference to be transformed into 
an opportunity for fairer international trade rules and an opportunity for developing countries to 
succeed in counterbalancing the dominance of the developed countries, the dialogue within and 
between the groups of developing countries must continue to be deepened.328 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Few of the victims of poverty-related diseases have heard of the WTO.  Fewer still have had an 
opportunity to engage in debate over the implications of its rules for their welfare.  Yet world trade 
laws have profound implications for developing countries –and nowhere more so than in the area 
of patents and public health.  Governments in all developing [countries] are currently 
implementing sweeping changes in order to bring national legislation in line with WTO 
obligations [under TRIPS].  [Developing countries are doing this to avoid] threats of trade 
sanctions initiated by [developed countries, primarily the] US government acting on behalf of 
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corporations [including pharmaceutical companies,] which stand to gain significant increases in 
their profits as a result of the new [patent] regime [being strictly enforced in developing 
countries].329
Between 2000 and 2020, it is estimated that sixty-eight million people will die from HIV-
AIDS in the most affected countries.330 Further, adult HIV-AIDS infection rates have escalated 
to 20.1% in South Africa and 37.5% in Botswana.331 The HIV-AIDS epidemic continues to 
consume China, Indonesia, Central Asia, the Baltic States, and North Africa.332 Since the 
adoption of TRIPS in 1994, slight improvements have been made in the global pharmaceutical 
patent system through the participation of the member countries in the WTO, the recognition by 
governments of the importance of the public health of its citizens and global public health, and 
the gradual flexibility of pharmaceutical companies in finding a solution to the HIV-AIDS 
crisis.333 
TRIPS should be amended or reformed to consider the needs of developing countries.  
The implicit and explicit exceptions contained in TRIPS Article 8, 27, 30, 31, and 73, the Doha 
Declaration, and the Decision have all attempted to clarify the power of individual countries to 
protect the public health of their citizens.  In reality, these safeguards are not enough.  The 
arguments developed countries offer for the imposition of stringent patent protection in 
developing countries do not outweigh the potential harm created by allowing pharmaceutical 
companies to have monopolies that limit access to essential medicines.  Pharmaceutical 
companies, generic drug manufacturers, and governments all have a duty to improve the access 
of developing countries to drugs including combination and second-line generic drugs.  The 
current domestic pharmaceutical protection of patents in developing countries including India 
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and South Africa is emerging with the January 1, 2005 TRIPS compliance mandate.  Some 
possible solutions to improve access to drugs in developing countries are allowing generic 
competition, creating a tiered pricing mechanism to reduce prices, and providing political 
support for utilizing the public health safeguards contained in TRIPS.  Unfortunately, AIDS and 
other infectious diseases are only some of the numerous problems facing developing countries 
today.  Developing countries also lack the infrastructure and public health systems necessary to 
implement widespread disease treatment programs.  Developed and developing countries should 
work together to develop an international pharmaceutical patent system that truly promotes 
global public health by providing equal access to all.       
 
